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Abstract. This paper establishes a Tobin‟s q model in which house prices fluctuate around their long run 
equilibrium due to fluctuations in credit availability and income. It is shown that house prices are positively 
related to credit in the short run, however, negatively related to the availability of credit in the long run. Using 
survey data on banks‟ willingness to lend and data on disintermediation for the US it is shown that the 
availability of credit is the principal variable driving house prices around their long run equilibrium. Shocks to 
interest rates and income have only secondary effects on house price fluctuations. 
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I.  Introduction 
Credit has often been considered as being important for business fluctuations. Financial considerations play an 
integral part of investment behaviour in Keynes‟ General Theory. Minsky (1975) notes that Keynes 
distinguishes between two states of confidence as determinants of investment behaviour. First, borrowers‟ belief 
in the returns to the investment project. Second, the „state of credit‟ which is governed by lenders‟ confidence in 
financing borrowers. The Austrian economists such as Hayek and Mises have emphasised the role of credit in 
driving investment cycles (Machlup, 1974). The model of Blinder (1988) attributes supply side failures to 
credit. Bernanke (1983) finds that credit played a vital role in explaining the length and the depth of the Great 
Depression and Calomiris and Hubbard (1989) show that the availability of credit contributed substantially to 
output fluctuations in the US during the period 1894-1909. Furthermore, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show how differences in borrower risk and their ability to signal this can result in 
inefficient allocation of credit and, in turn, drive output fluctuations. The recent sub-prime crisis has brought 
credit as a lever of house price fluctuations to the centre of the debate. In particular, recent events 
internationally suggest an important role for credit in house price dynamics. 
  The large majority of the theoretical and empirical house pricing models do not consider credit as a 
source of house price fluctuations. The main theoretical house price models that are available such as 
Dougherty and Van Order (1982), Poterba (1984) and Mankiw and Weil (1989) do not include credit as a 
determinant of house prices. There are very few empirical studies of house prices testing for the influence of 
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credit, and these are mainly for European housing markets. Surveying 22 empirical studies of house prices, an 
OECD paper (2005) looking at house price fundamentals identifies only one study that considers the influence 
of credit supply on house prices, namely Annett (2005). The study of Annett (2005) includes the log of real 
credit supplied as an explanatory variable for European wide house prices. Annett (2005) conclude that credit 
only matters for a small number of countries in the short to medium-term, but yields greater influence in the 
long run. Using mortgage stock as a proxy for credit availability, Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) find that 
credit constraints have been influential for house prices in the UK. Koskela et al. (1992) find that the ratio of 
debt and income is influential for house prices in Finland. Meen (1990) proxies mortgage rationing by a 
measure of excess mortgage demand above mortgage supply and finds that house prices in the UK are more 
responsive to exogenous shocks when mortgage rationing is reduced.  
  This paper suggests that credit plays a fundamental role for fluctuations in house prices around their 
long run trend. The highly pro-cyclical nature of house prices in the post-WWII period has often been attributed 
to income fluctuations (see, for a survey, Girouard et al., 2006). However, there is no clear rationale as to why 
this should be so in the neoclassical framework since income fluctuations on business cycle frequencies are 
expected to be temporary and, as such, should not change permanent income. The pro-cyclicality of house 
prices in the post-WWII period is more likely to be a result of credit cycles because house purchases, to a large 
extent, are credit financed. The lumpiness of housing purchases as well as the tax advantages of debt financing 
investment means that credit is the preferred, and sometimes the only feasible, way for an individual to buy a 
house. Accordingly, if credit is constrained, the provision of credit to the residential market becomes important 
for house price dynamics; where credit supply is constrained, so is the effective demand for housing. 
  The contribution of the paper is to show how credit and demand constraints influence house prices in a 
Tobin‟s q model of house prices and, particularly, to show empirically that lenders‟ willingness to supply 
residential mortgages is influential for house price fluctuations in the US. The Tobin‟s q model establishes an 
empirical relationship between house prices, willingness to lend, interest rates, demand, and acquisition costs. 
From the investor‟s first order conditions it is shown that house prices are driven by acquisition costs and credit 
constraints in the long run and by credit, interests, acquisition costs, and demand shocks in the short run. While 
house prices are positively related to credit in the short run, we get the remarkable analytical result that house 
prices are negatively related to the availability of credit in the long run. The model extends Tobin‟s q models of 
Poterba (1984, 1991) and Madsen (2009) by allowing for credit and demand constraints.  
  An important distinction between the model in this paper and a large body of the literature on the role of 
credit in economic activity is that it is the quantity of the availability of credit and not the price of risk that is 
important for fluctuations in house prices. There is a broad literature discussing credit constraining mechanisms 
that extends beyond the housing market. Generally the literature can be divided into two strands. Firstly, is the 3 
 
literature originating from asymmetric information theory, beginning principally with Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
(see also Stiglitz, 1988). This strand of the literature emphasises the optimality of quantitative restriction of 
credit supply for lenders facing an informational disadvantage in credit markets. The second strand of research 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994, and Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995) assumes lenders have a greater capacity for distinguishing risk characteristics of potential 
borrowers and can optimally price each borrower‟s investment proposition such that reduced lending only 
occurs as a result of borrowers being priced out of the market, rather than rationed out. Assuming the 
conventional relationship between risk and expected return, discerning lenders are able to distinguish between 
borrowers of different risk classes and form contracts which price the risky investment projects accordingly.  
This paper progresses in the spirit of the classic asymmetric information literature and, in fact, aims to 
assess the significance of quantitative credit constraints for house price dynamics. The model, which is derived 
in Section 3, assumes that quantitative credit constraints are an important tool in minimising the cost of risk for 
traditional bank based mortgage lenders as shown by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). The implication is that, at a 
given interest rate, if riskiness is perceived to have increased, the supply of credit will be constrained without 
the subsequent increase in the price of credit that would conventionally be observed in more complete markets.  
  In contrast to other empirical models looking at credit constraints, this paper uses survey evidence of 
bankers‟ willingness to lend and disintermediation as direct measures of the availability of credit. To our best 
knowledge, this is the first paper to consider the influence of banks‟ willingness to lend on house prices. Many 
papers on the relationship between economic activity and credit, and most of the few papers on house prices and 
credit, use credit aggregates as proxies for credit availability. The problem with using this measure of credit is 
that the amount of credit may not be indicative of the ease of obtaining credit. First, Kashyap et al. (1993) show 
that credit endogenously responds to output fluctuations. Second, the actual credit supplied does not give any 
information about the relative supply of credit; reduced credit provision could occur either when supply is 
constrained or when demand for credit is low. Third, housing credit tends to follow house prices simply because 
lending practices relate to the value of the collateral. It follows that if house prices increase due to factors that 
are unrelated to credit, housing credit will passively respond to the higher value of the collateral. Fourth, Jaffee 
and Modigliani (1969) argue that credit aggregates comprise of demand as well as supply of credit. In a state of 
low credit demand, credit may be reflected in low credit aggregates even if banks are willing to lend out. 
Some asset pricing models and empirical investigations have looked at the role of credit and liquidity in 
asset pricing generally; for its own sake (Holmströ m and Tirole, 1998), or in the context of its role in monetary 
policy and real output fluctuations (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1998 and Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, 
respectively). The model in this paper differs from existing models in that the focus is a Tobin‟s q model 
looking specifically at housing investment and a simple credit quantity constraint is assumed. The paper 4 
 
proceeds firstly with a discussion of the relationship between willingness to lend, disintermediation and house 
prices (Section 2). Section 3 establishes a Tobin‟s q model of house prices. The influence of credit on house 
prices is tested in section 4 using quarterly data for the US over the period 1966.1Q to 2008.2Q. The final 
section concludes. 
 
2.  House Prices and Willingness to Lend  
Consider the intermediary (the „bank‟ hereafter) as a profit maximiser that intermediates between those looking 
to invest their savings and those in need of funds for investment. In a deterministic setting, profit will simply be 
a function of the volume and price of loans after accounting for the cost of attracting and maintaining savers‟ 
funds. Introducing risk presents a problematic trade-off for the bank; where any move by the bank to channel 
funds to higher returning investment projects will come at the cost of higher risk exposure. As noted in the 
Introduction, Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), and 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) assume that lenders have the capacity for distinguishing risk characteristics of 
potential borrowers and can price each borrower‟s investment proposition accordingly, solving the trade-off 
problem.  
  There are arguably many cases where risk characteristics cannot be perfectly distinguished amongst 
borrowers. Indeed, it could be reasonably proposed that borrowers themselves, whilst having the informational 
advantage, do not know the size of the risk they will encounter. In such cases, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show 
that instead of increasing interest rates to recover increasing expected costs of risk, credit supply is contracted 
and rationed to investments that can be assessed as low risk for any existing level of interest rates. The rationale 
is that there are some investment projects that are sensitive to interest rate changes. When interest rates are 
pushed up to cover expected losses, previously feasible investment projects of low risk (and low return) are now 
no longer feasible as the expected return for these projects does not exceed the opportunity cost of investment. 
Consequently, the quality of the remaining pool of borrowers deteriorates, further increasing the probability of 
default. Therefore, as the price of credit directly impacts on the quality of willing borrowers, banks will balance 
their risk and expected return trade-off by restraining the quantity as well as the price of credit when faced with 
imperfect information about borrower risk. Conversely, Stiglitz (1988) argues elsewhere that there may be other 
cases where investors are not sensitive to interest rates at all within a certain range; interest rate changes are 
insignificant compared to large uncertainties associated with the returns to investment, which are often of 
magnitudes of 10, 15, 20 or 25 percent. Where the pool of willing borrowers does not deteriorate with increased 
interest rates, the quantity of credit will remain a more important determinant of investment than the cost of 
credit.  5 
 
Housing investment, at first look, appears to be less uncertain than non-residential investment because of 
high persistence in the demand for housing services and low short-term volatility of house prices. However, the 
large fluctuations in house prices on business-cycle and medium term frequencies and a high covariance 
between house returns and consumption growth, render residential investment a highly uncertain and risky 
investment; particularly for investors with a limited investment horizon and for house buyers for which future 
remortgaging depends on house price appreciations. This may explain why interest elasticities in house price 
models are often low and well below the theory-prediction of minus one (see for example Madsen, 2009, for the 
US, and Annett, 2005, for the OECD countries ). The low interest rate elasticities suggest that credit may not be 
too influential for house prices through the cost of borrowing.  
 
2.1 Willingness to lend and house price fluctuations 
This subsection shows that credit supply plays a potential important role in the housing market. It is proposed 
that a preferable measure to distinguish the extent of credit supply constraints is data that captures 
intermediaries‟ willingness to lend. With regard to the more traditional channel of credit provision, survey data 
recording the willingness to lend of US domestic banks and foreign bank‟s agencies in the US has been 
collected since the 1961 by the Federal Reserve Bank (Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on bank lending 
practices, Federal Reserve Bank, 2008). The most recent survey collected responses from 55 US domestic banks 
and 21 US branches and agencies of foreign banks.  
The data used to capture banks‟ willingness to lend in this analysis has been constructed from two of the 
survey questions. The primary data source spanning 1990.1Q–2008.4Q captures information pertaining to the 
question of whether the bank‟s credit standards for approving applications from individuals for mortgage loans 
to purchase homes has tightened over the past three months. Since data on this question is available first from 
1990.1Q it is spliced and backdated to 1966.1Q with survey data on the question as to whether the bank‟s 
willingness to make consumer instalment loans has changed relative to three months ago. Willingness to make 
consumer instalment loans is an excellent proxy for credit standards for mortgage loans since the correlation 
coefficient between the two variables is 0.7over the overlapping period 1990.1Q–2008.4Q. Furthermore, 
Bachetta and Gerlach (1997) found that the response of aggregate consumption showed no systematic 
difference to either consumer or mortgage credit. Finally, Leamer (2009) finds that cycles in homes and 
durables are very similar, which suggests that they are influenced by the same factors.  
  In this paper, credit standards measure the proportion of banks that report to have tightened the above-
described credit standards over the past four quarters. The reported levels of credit standards are used to 
measure changing willingness to lend because respondents answer the question in relation to the previous 6 
 
quarter‟s standards. Credit standards are transformed to four-quarter changes in standards by summing over the 
past four quarters of „changing credit standards‟. 
2 
Figure 1. Growth in US House Prices and Banks‟ Willingness to Lend. 
 
Notes. The data are measured as the percentage change from the quarter one year before. House prices are deflated by expected 
consumer price inflation over the next year (University of Michigan Survey of Consumers). Willingness to lend is measured as one 
minus the fraction of banks reporting tightened credit standards. The data are normalized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 
one. Credit standards measure the negative of tightened credit standards for mortgage loans. See the data appendix for data sources. 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the four-quarter change in real house prices and willingness to lend which is computed as one 
minus the fraction of responding banks that affirmed tightened standards. The growth in real house prices is 
measured as the growth in nominal house prices minus expected inflation over the next 12 months. House prices 
are measured by the Freddie Mac Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index and the expected inflation is from 
the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers. To render the two data series comparable they are 
normalized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The data show a close relationship between 
willingness to lend and house prices over a large fraction of the considered period. Except for the period at the 
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where C is the four quarter change in credit standards. The equation shows that the four-period sum of changing credit standards 
measures the change in willingness to lend relative to four quarters earlier.  7 
 
beginning of the 1980s and the period 1995-2006, it appears that house prices are explained almost entirely by 
the willingness to lend. There is a tendency for credit to precede house prices with a lead time of around one to 
six quarters, which is supported in the empirical estimates below. Thus easier access to credit stimulates 
demand for houses. This, in turn, leads to higher house prices with a time-lag.  
The path of banks‟ willingness to lend may change in accordance with macroeconomic conditions, 
borrowers‟ net asset positions and the stance of monetary policy. According to Bernanke and Gertler (1989), 
Calomiris and Hubbard (1990), Gertler (1992), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), Kiyotaki and Moore (1993), and 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), risk is often identified with balance sheet indicators such as net worth and debt to 
equity ratios. Banks‟ perceived risk may also vary with general macroeconomic prospects (Stiglitz, 1988). An 
increasing likelihood of a recession increases expected default rates among borrowers and curbs willingness to 
lend. Monetary policies can also influence the willingness to lend when banks have no free reserves. However, 
in instances where banks have large excess reserves, as during the Great Depression, willingness to lend is 
decided quite independently of the monetary policy stance (Stiglitz, 1988).  
The relative importance of each of these factors in willingness to lend cycles shown in Figure 1 cannot 
always be easily distinguished because they tend to coincide. Willingness to lend was reduced significantly in 
the periods 1968-1969, 1972-1974, 1977-1980, 1986-1991 and 2006-present; in all events before business cycle 
downturns. Real stock prices declined significantly in 1969, 1974, 1982, and since 2008. These downturns have 
occurred in the later stages of willingness to lend cycles. Judging from changes in the FED funds rate and 
Romer and Romer‟s (1990) reading of the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, monetary policy 
was tightened in December 1968, April 1974, August 1978, and October 1979; again predominantly in the later 
stages of credit downturns. Thus, the turning points in banks‟ willingness to lend have preceded that of 
monetary policy, stock prices and business cycles. As such, bank‟s willingness to lend contains information that 
is independent of these factors. 
  There are two periods during which the relationship between willingness to lend and house prices is 
blurred. The first is the beginning of the 1980s during which the willingness to lend increased markedly while 
house prices only increased moderately. However, real interest rates on a 30-year mortgage loan, which was 
back then the dominant form of lending, increased no less than 11 percentage points from 1979 to 1982 and, as 
such, exerted strong downward pressure on house prices. The second period is the approximate period from 
1995 to 2006. In this period the willingness to lend was by and large neutral despite substantial house price 
inflation. The 3.5 percentage point reduction in real interest rates during the period from 2002 to 2006 has 
probably contributed to increasing house prices during the same period; however, it cannot have been the sole 
cause of house price inflation. Indeed, there is plenty of evidence suggesting that credit standards were 
extraordinary lax and credit abundant from 1995, when the house price ascent started, to the house price peak in 8 
 
2006 (Mian and Sufi, 2009, Presidential Working Group on Financial Markets, 2008, Beattie, 2008). Seen in 
this light, the neutrality of banks‟ lending standards appears peculiar. However, results from the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation‟s previously regular Report on Underwriting Practices give support to the neutral stance 
of banks during the most recent house price run-up. They show that regulated home equity loan providers did in 
fact have fairly secure mortgage standards over the 1998-2002 period (later figures are not available from this 
source because the last report was published in 2002).  
  This paper hypothesizes that the main reason for the marked increase in house prices during the most 
recent housing boom is due to the growth of non-traditional mortgage lending. Since the mid 1990s, there has 
been a variety of changes in the way residential mortgages applications are made and the parties involved in 
supplying and originating mortgage contracts. On a general level, government policy has influenced fund flows 
available for mortgage lending through government-sponsored enterprises. Secondary mortgage market 
purchases and technology have increased the automation and speed of mortgage closure procedures. It is 
though, developments of a more structural nature that have altered credit supply incentives and have potentially 
driven more important changes in financial intermediaries‟ willingness to provide residential mortgages. The 
growing prevalence of mortgage brokers and non-commercial bank home lenders has increased the access of 
many to mortgage finance and boosted the liquidity of mortgage assets, respectively.  
Stiglitz (2008) argues that the ease of on-selling risk created by the growth of the mortgage 
securitization market, in combination with the increased prevalence of mortgage brokers provides perverse 
incentives to mortgage originators and biases their lending decisions towards a greater number of riskier loans. 
The prevalence of the use of mortgage brokers reflects the growing choice of lenders and a larger variety of 
mortgage types to consider from the mid 1990s. However, the introduction of broking agents has brought 
another layer of informational asymmetry and contradicting incentives into the market for credit (Stiglitz, 
2008). While mortgage brokers are given incentives to originate loans, they are seldom able to be held 
accountable for loan defaults in the future. Because brokers get the benefit, but do not incur the risk, of 
expanding mortgage products to marginal market segments, the introduction of an „agent layer‟ in the mortgage 
market has significantly altered loan supply incentives.  
No general and direct evidence of mortgage brokers exploiting their situation is available. However, 
evidence of borrowers accepting riskier loan types whilst being ill informed of their loan terms implies that 
there has been some exploitation of the perverse incentives of the market structure. In particular, surveys of 
mortgage holders with more complex, and inherently more risky, loan types such as Adjustable Rate Mortgage 
(ARM) variants like ARM hybrids, Option ARMs and interest only ARMs show that there is a prevalence for 
these borrowers to underestimate the interest rate risk and their ability to honour their future mortgage debt. The 
data suggests that lower income, less educated, minority group and elderly borrowers are those least financially 9 
 
literate and most prone to have misunderstood their loan terms and have made financial decisions indicating 
poor judgement given their financial circumstances (Bucks and Pence, 2008). To the extent that these groups 
rely on mortgage brokers to obtain loans, it is possible that financial incentives to brokers for originating loans 
may have encouraged less scrutiny of borrowers‟ long term ability to pay loans. All this has translated into an 
overall increasing willingness to lend. 
The other key structural development in financial markets is that risky assets became easier to sell. The 
development of an extensive structured financial asset market backed by mortgage assets resulted in growth in 
disintermediation, heightened sophistication of mortgage products and the proliferation of new mortgage based 
financial derivatives. While the efficiency of the mortgage based financial derivative market has been impeded 
by perverse incentives in the market structure at both the origination and distribution stages of mortgage assets, 
these market features do not explain the impetus for the market‟s original development. The demand for such a 
market has been driven by several factors that have heightened in importance over the last couple of decades. 
Like most innovation in financial instruments, the desire for diversification and higher yields (especially 
relative to other fixed income assets like US treasuries most recently) were prime drivers of product creation. 
Additionally, the ease of on-selling risk could have made risk itself appear less important in the minds of those 
trading mortgage backed securities; the traders‟ aims were to avoid being the last ones left holding the risk at 
the time when collateral became of speculative interest and hence ambiguous value.  
The selling of risk embodied in new products necessitated new credit rating services. However, a US 
Congress investigation found credit ratings agencies had conflicts of interest when establishing risk ratings for 
new financial instruments as they were paid by clients who have an interest in a favorable credit rating (see 
Beattie, 2008). Thus, combined with changes in regulation and conflicts of interest in the credit standard rating 
agencies‟ risk rating procedures, recent financial innovation boosted the development of a large market of 
mortgage backed securities (MBS) of questionable quality.  
A major regulatory change that further enhanced the availability of credit is the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act (1999). This Act allowed commercial banks, brokerage firms, hedge funds, institutional investors, pension 
funds and insurance companies to freely invest in each other‟s businesses as well as fully integrate their 
financial operations. Relaxed regulation created a much broader market for off-balance sheet arrangements and 
the structured investment packages being backed by mortgage assets. Indeed, as a major source of mortgage 
funding growth from 1996 through to the recent housing market downturn, demand for purchases of overrated 
MBS added significantly to the liquidity of the mortgage asset market and was the most prevalent source of 
mortgage finance growth since the last major wave of mortgage refinancing in 2003 (Economic Report of the 
President: Table B-76, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/tables09.html#top).  10 
 
In sum, the establishment of a broad market for MBS and other mortgage based derivates, in 
combination with more lax underwriting standards (Mian and Sufi, 2009), encouraged extensive lending to 
those on the fringe of the housing market. The subprime lending market consequently grew substantially from 
under 4 per cent in 2000 to over 30 per cent by 2006 (Coleman et al., 2008). Disintermediation accommodated 
this trend. The aggregate willingness to lend grew as alternative lending types grew and these lenders steadily 
increased their market share until the peak in house prices in the second quarter of 2007. According to one real 
estate industry news site, National Mortgage News (Blake, 2008), mortgage brokers in the US received no less 
than 80 per cent of the market share one year before house prices peaked. The shift from traditional to 
alternative mortgage origination reflects the corresponding shift in mortgage funding. In terms of outstanding 
mortgage debt, at the start of our data sample in 1966 major commercial banking and savings institutions 
comprised 79 per cent of the market. However, by 2006 it had dropped to a low of only 35 per cent (Report of 
the President, Table B-76, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/tables09.html#top). The accommodative role of 
disintermediation has been associated with an easing of the overall credit standards. Mian and Sufi (2009) show 
that the extent of disintermediation in the mortgage market is inversely correlated with loan approval standards. 
To the extent that mortgage brokers, and indeed other financial intermediaries, have different incentives and 
willingness‟ to lend than banks, the survey data on bank‟s willingness to lend used to capture ease of credit 
supply is likely to be deficient in capturing the willingness to lend among all lenders during the most recent 
housing boom. 
To capture the willingness to supply credit from non-commercial banking sources, the flow of MBS is 
used. This measures the funding of mortgages from those parties most instrumental in funding subprime loans 
during the last boom and least interested in the long term performance of the loan asset. The flow of MBS, on a 
quarterly basis is available from the Federal Reserve Bank‟s Flow of Funds Accounts (2009). This data is used 
to capture the extent of funding in the mortgage market due to securitisation. A comparison of the MBS flow 
data with the Security Industry and Financial Markets Association‟s (SIFMA, 2009) data on MBS issues in the 
US since 1996 shows comparable trends.  
Figure 2 maps the Federal Reserve Bank‟s Flow of Funds Accounts‟ data showing the change in density 
of MBS in total lending. Being only 2-3 percent of total mortgage issues the 1980s, MBS did not play any 
significant role for the availability of credit. Over time, however, the MBS density has increased to significant 
levels. The 1990s saw the availability of credit for housing gradually increased through MBS issuance. 
However, it was really in the period 2003 to 2007 where MBS became the most important contributor to credit 
provision and thus an important driver of the recent house price boom. Accordingly, the influence of the growth 
in issuance of mortgage backed securities shown in figure 2 was also exacerbated by their prevalence. The 
increasing importance and rate of issuance of MBS in total mortgage during the periods 1998-1999 and 2003-11 
 
2006 explains why the access to housing credit gained momentum during the resent housing price boom, 
despite banks‟ willingness to lend remaining neutral. The sharp fall in the willingness to lend since the 
beginning of 2006 and the fall in the density of MBS since the end of 2007 have resulted in a sharp contraction 
in the credit availability. 
 
Figure 2. Quarterly change in issues of Mortgage Backed Securities as a proportion of total mortgage issues. 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank‟s Flow of Funds Accounts (2009). 
 
3.   A Tobin’s q model with quantitative demand and credit constraints 
The model presented in this section incorporates credit and income constraints into the optimisation problem of 
the representative residential house investor following the Tobin‟s q models of Poterba (1984, 1991) and 
Madsen (2009). These constraints influence house prices because of adjustment costs in investment, downward 
price rigidities, time-varying willingness to lend, habits and regulatory constrains that prevent markets from 
clearing instantaneously. Using a Tobin‟s q model for non-residential investment, Blanchard (1983) shows that 
demand is influential for non-residential investment because goods markets fail to clear. Similarly, non-clearing 
conditions can be observed in the housing markets given that income is the principal scale variable in almost all 
empirical house prices models (Girouard et al., 2006). The importance of income for house prices may, to some 
extent, reflect that some households are credit rationed. An unexpected increase in income eases the credit 
constraint of credit constrained households.  
  It is assumed that the cost of borrowing is set exogenously by the international credit market in a fixed 
exchange rate regime, or by monetary authorities under flexible exchange rates. An endogenous discount rate is 
not considered since it increases the complexity of the model without affecting the steady-state properties of the 
model nor giving additional insight into the influence of credit and demand shocks on house prices (see 
Madsen, 2009, for an endogenous discount rate in a Tobin‟s q model of house prices). The assumption of an 
exogenous interest rate appears to be realistic in the current economic environment in which new mortgage 
loans have been increasingly dominated by the adjustable interest rate loan types (Girouard et al. 2006), which 
to a large extent, are determined by the FED funds rate.  12 
 
 
3.1   The objective problem of the residential investor 






  max                       (1) 
where V is the present value of residential investment, r is the required return to the investor and γ is the 
investor‟s real cash flow defined as the gross earnings after investment cost deductions. This is given as 
follows: 
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where b is the fraction of housing investment financed by debt; i is the nominal interest rate paid by the investor 
on the housing loan;   is the investment adjustment costs; h is the housing stock of the individual investor; H is 
the economy-wide housing stock; I is the amount of gross residential investment undertaken; and π is the 
inflation rate. A dot over a variable signifies the change over time. The investment adjustment cost function is 
assumed to be convex and symmetric in investment.    H  is the value of housing output or rental payment to 
the property owner, which is a declining function of the economy-wide housing stock due to diminishing 
returns to housing stock. Accordingly, the term      h i b h H      is the profit after payment of interests on debt. 
The term   I h h b ) / ( 1 1      is investment costs which consist of the fraction of both direct investment and 
adjustment cost expenses that are not debt financed. The two first right-hand-side terms are cash-flows. The last 
term,    h b , is the inflation-induced reduction in the real value of debt. In this model it is assumed that 
housing investment, including both direct and adjustment cost expenses, is debt financed and as such, b = 1. 
This is not a severe restriction since the majority of housing investments are debt financed and rarely equity 
financed. As becomes clear below, the credit constraint cannot be binding if alternative financing is available 
and if the borrower is not constrained in these markets.  
The investor makes their decision subject to the capital accumulation constraint where depreciation is 
ignored for simplicity without affecting the results (see Madsen, 2009): 
 
I h   ,                         (3) 
 
and a credit constraint such that investment is capped at  I : 
 
I h h I   )] / ( 1 [   .                      (4) 
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This constraint is valid as all investment, including adjustment costs, is debt financed and therefore I  is entirely 
determined by credit provision. Limitations on demand for housing services are also considered as a 
constraining influence for housing investment. As property investors are assumed to be rational and forward 
looking, housing output is therefore also potentially constrained by the quantity of housing services demanded, 
Q: 
 
      h H Q   .                       (5) 
 
Under perfect market clearing this constraint would not apply as prices would adjust to clear the market. 
However, there is plenty of evidence suggesting that house prices do not clear instantaneously; particularly not 
in declining markets in which the stock of houses for sale substantially exceeds that in booming markets (Stein, 
1995). Under these circumstances demand becomes influential for house sales and house prices.  
Combining (1)-(5) yields the current-value Hamiltonian of the representative investor: 
 
              Q h H I h q I h I I I h I b i bh h H
q I h               ) ( )] / ( 1 [ ] ) / ( 1 [[ 1 ) ( ) (
, , , ,        
 
   (6) 
 
 
where  , q and μ are the shadow values,  1 0    and  1 0    . Here,   is the present value to the investor of 
loosening up the credit constraint by one unit, q is the capitalized value on investment from having one 
additional value of housing stock and μ is the present value to the investor of loosening up the demand 
constraint by one unit. 
  The first order conditions are as follows: 
         i b b h I rq q rq q
h
h h                

 
    1 1
2   ,         (7)  
                       

 
b b h I q
I
I 1 1 1 1 0
























1 0 ,                    (9) 
h I
q
   

 






) ( 0 
 ,                      (11) 




t e qh .                      (12) 
The first condition (7) is the no-arbitrage condition, which says that required returns equal the capital gain plus 
dividends. This condition stipulates that the effective cost of capital is equal to the adjusted returns to capital 14 
 
and must hold in equilibrium. Condition (8) stipulates that in steady state, the real value of an additional unit of 
housing is equal to the real marginal cost of this additional unit, inclusive of its adjustment costs, plus the real 
shadow cost of credit at the margin. The third condition, equation (9) restates the credit constraint and the 
fourth, equation (10), the capital accumulation constraint which necessitates that current housing investment 
after adjustment costs be equal to the change in housing stock. Equation (11) requires that housing services are 
equal to the quantity demanded. Finally, the transversality condition embodied in equation (12) imposes the 
constraint that the present value of housing stock at time infinity tends towards zero; it is required to ensure a 
non-explosive system. 
  Inserting the housing stock adjustment costs function  h h/ (  ) = h I 
2 , where α is a constant, into 
























h h  .                    (13) 
 
This equation shows that the housing stock is increasing if the shadow value of housing in excess of the costs of 
building a house after adjusting for the decrease in costs due to debt financing and the shadow costs of credit. In 
the conventional case of no credit constraints and no debt financing equation (13) reduces to the conventional 
Tobin‟s q model in which investment is positive when the shadow value of houses exceeds 1. In other words 
investment takes place when the house price exceeds its acquisition costs. In the case where there is 100 per 
cent debt financing, b = 1, when the shadow value of housing exceeds the real costs of credit, new investment in 
housing is profit maximising as houses command a higher price from the market than their cost of construction. 
In other words, the less credit constrained the market and the higher the level of debt financing, the larger the 
investment in housing.  








,                        (14) 
 






















       i b b
h
I






 is the net rental income per unit of housing 
capital, and r is the required returns to housing investment. It is here that demand for housing services matter as 
demand reduces μ and thus lowers the revenue product of housing investment. In steady state equation (14) is a 
                                                 
3 This particular adjustment function is used because it gives an explicit solution. For the adjustment const function used by Summers 
(1981) there is no explicit solution. 15 
 
standard asset market equilibrium condition in which the shadow value of the house equals to expected 
dividends divided by the required returns.  
 
3.2  Steady state 
Imposing the steady state conditions that  0   h q    on equations (13) and (14) and assuming that all individuals 
are acting in the same way so that h aggregates to H, yields, after some manipulations, the following macro 
relationships, where asterisks signify steady state: 
 
















1 i b b r
H ,                  (15) 
    b q 1 * ,                       (16) 
 
where H* is the level of the housing stock for which the market valuation of housing assets is exactly equal to 
the acquisition cost of housing adjusted for credit constraints and therefore there are no incentives to invest or 
disinvest. Note that equation (15) expresses a negative relationship between H* and the terms inside the squared 
bracket. Increased revenue product through reduced credit and demand constraints, as well as increased debt 
financing and increased inflationary erosion of real debt result in arbitrage opportunities for housing investors 
and therefore increases in housing stock. q* is the market valuation of the present value of the expected returns 
to the investment in one unit of housing. When investment is financed completely with debt (b = 1), the only 
up-front acquisition costs required are shadow costs due to credit constraints. Increased constraints on credit, 
relative to the non-constrained case, increase the shadow costs of investment and thus reduce incentives to 
invest in housing. The existing housing stock will yield a higher per-unit return in this case, raising the market 
value of housing.  
 
3.3   Steady State Multipliers 
In order to understand the dynamics of the system, it is necessary to identify how the endogenous variables, q* 
and H*, respond to exogenous shocks. The effects of changes in the shadow cost of investment, the price of 
capital and the shadow value of housing services on the steady state level of housing stock and the market price 
of housing are:  
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3.4  Shadow cost of houses 
As earlier defined, q is the marginal capitalised value of a unit of housing; it is the market price of housing at 
the margin. Provided that the usual homogeneity assumptions are satisfied, the marginal q equals the average q 
(Hayashi, 1982). Conventionally, Tobin‟s q for housing is measured as house prices deflated by construction 
costs (Summers, 1981, Poterba, 1991, Abraham and Hendershott, 1996, and Meen, 2002). Madsen (2009) 
computes the acquisition costs of housing as a geometric average of agricultural land prices and construction 
costs. Using the broader definition of acquisition costs yields the following shadow price of the housing stock: 
 





,                       (22) 
 
where p
h is the price of a unit of housing, lc is the cost of agricultural land, cc is a construction cost index and α 
measures the proportion of total acquisition costs made up by the purchase of land.   
 
3.5   The dynamic effects of credit and demand shocks on house prices  
The dynamic effects of demand and credit on house prices and housing stock are analyzed in Figures 3 and 4. 
Figure 3 shows the dynamic effects of an unexpected increase in real interest rates when investors have perfect 
foresight. Starting from the steady state equilibrium at the point E0 the  0 0  q   schedule shifts to the left (more 
correctly it changes slope) and the perfect foresight house market jumps to the point A because housing 
rents/services are capitalized at a higher discount rate. In contrast to the myopic market, the perfect foresight 
market will not jump the whole way down to the  0 1  q   line, because it knows that the relatively lower present 
value of housing rent will only last for the period in which the housing stock remains fixed. Since q is below its 
equilibrium value at the point A it is profitable to lower the stock of houses; the steady state housing stock is 
reduced by the increase in the cost of capital. The reduced housing stock increases the rental income per unit of 
housing; thus bringing up q towards its long run value. Under the assumption that the developers financing costs 
are not influenced by the interest rate increase, the shadow price of houses remains unaffected by interest rates 
in the long run; thus, the position of the  0  H   remains unaffected. 
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Figure 3. Unanticipated increase in interest rates 
and unanticipated positive demand shock with 
perfect foresight 





Demography and income influence the housing market through the channel of the demand constraint. A 
positive unexpected shift in demand or the demographic composition leads to a rightward shift in the  0  q   
schedule from  0 0  q   to  0 2  q  . The dynamics are symmetrically opposite to the interest rate analysis; the 
perfect foresight market will jump up to point B and from this point move towards the point E2 as the housing 
stock adjusts to its optimal level. From the dynamics it can be concluded that the shifts in income and in 
demography have only short term effects on house prices because the housing stock levels will adjust until the 
net rental income equals the required returns.  
Figure 4 considers the case of an unanticipated expansion in the supply of credit, which is equivalent to 
a relaxation of the credit constraint for the credit constrained housing investor. When credit constraints are 
permanently reduced, both the supply and demand side of the housing investment market are stimulated. The 
initial easing of credit, when housing stocks have not yet adjusted, leads to an excess demand for housing 
investment and an initial increase in the market price of housing. Simultaneously, the easing in credit reduces 
the shadow price of credit and the acquisition costs of housing accordingly; the h line shifts downwards 
representing the reduced steady state value of capital in the new equilibrium. As the market price of housing 
now exceeds the cost of building, housing construction is stimulated in the search for profit. As the housing 
stock increases, the marginal revenue to housing stock decreases. The housing investment market will move 
along the stable saddle path until the expected future returns to housing are again equal to the credit 18 
 
constraint-adjusted acquisition costs. In net terms, total housing stock is increased and the value of each house 
is reduced from 
*
0 q  to
*
1 q . 
The stable saddle path to the point E1 is drawn so that the point A is above E0 in Figure 4. However, it 
cannot, a priori, be ruled out that the point A is below E0, particularly not if the adjustment costs are low. The 
empirical finding below of a positive relationship between house prices and credit fluctuations is not a proof of 
the jump being positive. Conversely, if housing investors are myopic, they fail to account for the supply 
response to disequilibrium, and the house market jumps to the point B. In this event house prices are 
unambiguously positively related to the willingness to lend in the short run. 
  The analysis in this sub-section gives two important insights. First, interest rate and demand shocks have 
only temporary effects on house prices. This stands in contrast to conventional house price models in which 
house prices are driven by income and interest rates in the long run (see for survey Girouard et al., 2006). In the 
model here, reductions in interest rates and demand constraints increase q which in turn stimulates building 
investment until real house prices have reverted to their initial equilibrium. Second, loosening of credit 
constraints, if permanent, will permanently lower house prices. This may seem counterintuitive since credit 
expansions are usually associated with a booming house market. Furthermore, previous attempts to allow for 
credit constraints in house prices implicitly assume that house prices are positively related to credit in the long 
run. Here, the ease of access to credit renders it easier for builders to meet demand and the supply of houses 
will, consequently, increase in the long run. The recent house price boom in most OECD countries has been 
associated with a massive increase in the number of new dwellings as has been the case in previous housing 
price booms. To the extent that these booms have been driven by credit, the housing stock is permanently higher 
than would have been the case with no loosening of the credit constraints.  
 
4.  Empirical estimates 
The model derived in the previous section shows that credit, interest rates, and income determine house prices 
in the short run, while house prices are determined by credit constraint-adjusted acquisition costs in the long 
run. This section focuses on the short-run determinants of house prices while allowing house prices to converge 
towards their long run equilibrium in the second of the following two models.  
 
t t t t t
hr
t Sec Y UC C p 1 4 3 2 1 0 ln ln                  ,           (23) 
 
t t t t t t t t
h
t ECT lc cc Sec Y UC C p 2 1 6 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 ln ln ln ln                           ,   (24) 
 
where  is the four-quarter difference operator, p
hr is real house prices, p
h is nominal house prices, C is banks‟ 
willingness to lend, Y is real per capita disposable income, UC is the user costs of housing capital, Sec is the 19 
 
fraction of new loans that are securitized, lc is the cost of agricultural land (see Madsen, 2009 for a discussion 
of the use of agricultural land prices as a proxy for residential land prices), cc is a construction cost index, ECT 
is an error-correction term, which certifies that house prices gravitate toward their long-run equilibrium, and   
is a stochastic error term. Two different variables are used to deflate house prices in equation (23): consumer 
prices, which are conventionally used in empirical house price models, and expected inflation from the 
University of Michigan‟s Sureys of Consumers. Expected inflation is the correct deflator because house prices 
are asset prices that reflect the present value of expected returns from investing in houses or expected housing 
services. Data sources are detailed in the data appendix. 
  Two different measures of the cost of capital are used: user costs (UC) and the after-tax nominal interest 
rate ( ) 1 (   i ). User costs are estimated as:  
 
e i UC        ) 1 ( , 
 
where i is a 30-year mortgage interest rate,   is the income tax rate used for interest deductions,   is the 
depreciation rate, and 
e   is measured as the average annual real house price appreciation from 1967 to 2008 
plus the expected rate of inflation. This measure is used as it captures the long-term expected house price 
change, the decision variable most relevant for housing investors (see Hubbard and Mayer, 2009). The income 
tax rate is set to 30 percent, the depreciation rate is set to 2 percent, and inflation expectations are measured as 
survey expected inflation over the next 12 months.
4 The other measure of the cost of capital is the after tax 
nominal interest rate, ( ) 1 (   i ). This measure is used because Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008) find strong 
evidence of inflation illusion among house buyers; several house buyers fail to take into account that inflation 
lowers the real value of debt on a one-to-one basis. Below, the interest rate is also measured as a weighted 
average of fixed and adjustable mortgage interest rates (wai) to account for the increasing importance of 
variable interest loans in mortgage lending. However, it is important to note that wai is not the correct lending 
rate under the assumption that the long rate is an unbiased and efficient forecast of variable interest rates.  
  The variables were initially lagged up to six periods to capture the dynamic adjustment of house prices. 
However, only lagged values of willingness to lend were statistically significant. Thus, the models were 
regressed using lagged willingness to lend lagged two to six periods and contemporaneous values of all the 
other regressors. The model is estimated in four-quarter differences 1) to filter out the effects of time-varying 
seasonality on the estimates; 2) because the survey data on inflation expectations refer to expected inflation 
changes over the next four quarters; and 3) because the data are very noisy in quarterly first differences. The 
                                                 
4 The theoretically correct measure of expected inflation in user cost is expected house price inflation. This line of reasoning suggests 
that expected house acquisition cost inflation is the correct metric; however, these data are not available. Thus we follow the 
convention of using expected consumer price inflation. Since acquisition costs are highly correlated with consumer prices this 
approximation is probably not too bad. 20 
 
models are estimated using data over the period 1966.1Q to 2008.2Q for the US. The data sources are detailed 
in the data appendix. The Cochrane-Orcutt estimator is used to correct for first-order serial correlation. 




t ECT cc lc P     ln ln ln 2 1 0    ,                (25) 
 
where ECT is the disturbance term and is used as an error-correction term in the estimates of equation (24). This 
model shows whether house prices in the long run gravitate towards acquisition costs as predicted by the 
Tobin‟s q model. Credit constraints are not included in equation (25) since we were not able to find variables 
for the long-run credit constraints. It would be erroneous to include the accumulated willingness to lend as a 
proxy for credit conditions because of the potential random walk nature of its error term.
5 The model is 
estimated over the period 1975.1Q to 2008.2Q because data on land prices are first available from 1975. 
Regression of equation (25) yields: 
 
  t t
h
t cc lc P ln 27 . 1 ln 25 . 0 29 . 3 ln         DF = -2.69    98 . 0
2  R  
 
where DF is a Dickey-Fuller test for cointegration. The null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected at 
the 10% level but can at the 15% significance level. The low degree of cointegration is likely to reflect 1) that 
the sample period is too short to test for cointegration; 2) that the data for land prices and agricultural prices are 
interpolated from annual data; 3) that agricultural land prices are bad proxies for residential land prices; and 4) 
that house prices may be out of their long-run equilibrium for prolonged periods. The sum of the cost elasticities 
is 1.28, which is only slightly above the prediction of one. Land‟s share of acquisition costs is on the low side; 
probably for the same reasons as those explaining the lack of cointegration. 
The results of regressing restricted and unrestricted versions of equation (23) and (24) are displayed in 
Table 1. The serial correlation tests indicate that the residuals do not display first order serial correlation and the 
adjusted R
2‟s suggest that the model explains a large proportion of the variation in the growth in house prices. 
The parameter estimates are very robust to whether nominal or real house prices are used as the dependent 
variable and whether the growth in real house prices are based on ex ante or ex post inflation. This is a very 
important result because it shows that the model captures the essential house price dynamics and is not 
contingent on spurious correlations between the regressors and expected or actual inflation. As the model results 
are robust to the different measures of house prices, only the results from estimations using the real ex ante 
house prices as the dependent variable are reported in the table. 
 
                                                 
5 Suppose that willingness to lend has a measurement error that follows a random walk,  t t t e e    1 , where  t   is a random 
disturbance term. Accumulating willingness to lend over time leads yields the accumulated measurement error of  0 e t , where t is the 
time from period t0. This implies that the trend in the accumulated willingness to lend is potentially severely biased. 21 
 
Table 1. Parameter estimates of equations (23) and (24). 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 

































































































































































  -0.024 
(-0.221) 




  -0.006*** 
(-3.940) 






























∆ ln UCt 
 
  0.004*** 
(4.270) 
             
ECT      0.009 
(0.160) 
           
                   
∆ ln CCt 
 
    0.173*** 
(2.834) 
           
∆ ln LPt 
 
    0.627* 
(1.367) 
           
∆ wait 
 
      -0.004* 
(-1.663) 
         
∆ ln riskt 
 
        0.001 
(0.471) 
       
∆ rentt                0.052 
(0.178) 
 
∆ lnQt                  -0.000 
(-0.336) 
                   
R
2  0.822 
 
0.830  0.950  0.813  0.821  0.710  0.920  0.8033  0.926 
DW  1.858  1.809  1.865  1.869  1.852  1.764  1.682  1.909  1.627 
Notes:  The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  *, ** and *** signify 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively. The 
Cochrane-Orcutt estimation method is used to correct for first-order serial correlation. The estimation period is 1968.3Q-2008.2Q 
except for the estimates in column 3, 6, 7 and 9 in which the estimation periods are 1977.3Q-2008.2Q, 1968.3Q-1994.4Q, 1994.4Q-
2008.2Q and 1992.1Q-2008.2Q, respectively. E(p
hr) is real house prices based on expected inflation, p
hr is ex post real house prices, 
and p
h is nominal house prices. 
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The estimated coefficients of per capita income are mostly significant and the elasticity is on average 
0.3, which suggests that income fluctuations have some, but not much, influence on house price variations. The 
estimated coefficients of user costs are positive and significant, which is inconsistent with the predictions of 
standard user cost based models. The estimated coefficients of the nominal after-tax interest rate are negative 
and significant in most cases, which are consistent with the results of Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008) and 
highlight that nominal loan mortgage costs are the relevant cost variable for the majority of house buyers. The 
estimated after-tax interest rate elasticity is in the range of -0.10 and -0.20, which is above the predictions of 
minus one in conventional house price models.
6 Finally, a comparison of the estimates in column 4 with those 
in column 1 indicates that the weighted average mortgage interest rate is significant; however lenders and 
borrowers correctly consider the 30 year long run rate as the relevant mortgage interest rate.  
  The estimated coefficients of willingness to lend and securitization are highly significant in almost all 
the estimates. Willingness to lend significantly affects house prices with lags from two to six periods in almost 
all the estimates. These results give very strong empirical support to our hypothesis that willingness to lend is 
an essential factor behind house price dynamics and confirms the visual impression in Figure 1 that banks’ 
willingness to lend can explain a large part of house price fluctuations up to 1995 and after 2007. Further 
support for the credit hypothesis is given by the fact that the willingness to lend precedes house prices with a 
median lead time of one year. While precedence is no proof of causality, it nevertheless suggests that house 
prices do not drive willingness to lend but rather the other way around. If willingness to lend was not leading 
house prices, the following possibility could not have been ruled out: Increasing house prices increases the 
willingness to lend because they increase the collateral of existing house owners on their way up the property 
ladder. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients of securitization are highly significant in all the estimates. That 
the relationship between securitization and house prices is contemporaneous makes sense because Sec is 
measured at the time of the lending transaction.  
 
 
Turning to the regressions of the error-correction model (equation (24)) in column 3, banks willingness to lend 
and Sec remain highly significant. However, the estimated coefficient of income is rendered insignificant 
suggesting that income is not a robust determinant of house prices. The error-correction term is insignificant, 
which is consistent with the cointegration regression above. Land prices are mildly significant and positive 
while the estimated coefficient of construction costs is a strongly significant determinant of nominal house 
prices. This result is consistent with the predictions of the model that supply factors are influential for house 
prices in the short run as well as in the long run. 
                                                 
6 Standard house price models assume that house prices are the discounted value of housing services or rent. If real rent or house 
services per square and real interest rates are expected to remain constant to infinity, house prices are equal to rent divided by the 
nominal interest rate in the case in which house owners suffer from inflation illusion. 23 
 
 
4.1 Robustness checks 
This section tests the sensitivity of the estimates to estimation period, and the allowance for macro risk, rental 
income, and demand for credit. First consider macro risk. Thus far it has been assumed that the availability of 
credit has been the major force behind house price dynamics under the assumptions that banks prefer not to 
increase interest rates in times of heightened risk because high interest rates may attract high risk borrowers and 
because higher interest rates increases the likelihood of default. However, while not directly related to the 
housing market, research by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1994) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995) suggests lenders have a greater capacity for distinguishing risk 
characteristics of potential borrowers and can optimally price each borrower‟s investment proposition such that 
reduced lending only occurs as a result of lenders being priced out of the market, rather than rationed out. 
Correspondingly, Bernanke (1983), Calomiris and Hubbard (1989), and Mishkin (1990) use interest rate spreads 
between lower grade corporate and long-term treasury bonds as a proxy the availability of credit to assess the 
influence of credit markets on aggregate economic activity.  
  Unlike the corporate sector, there are limitations on interest rates available for high risk borrowers in the 
residential housing market because the freedom of banks to increase interest rates is restricted by regulation.
7 
Therefore, the interest rate spread between a one year low grade corporate bond (BAA) and a one-year treasury 
bond is used as a proxy for the prevalence of risky borrowers under the assumption that macroeconomic risk 
reflects the overall riskiness of mortgage borrowers. This measure is likely to be highly correlated with the 
riskiness of mortgage lending. Specifically, a large interest rate spread indicates uncertain prospects for the 
corporate sector. Since a large fraction of house owners are employed in these companies, their capacity to pay 
their mortgage must ultimately be related to the prospects of the firms by which they are employed. 
  The interest rate spread is included as an additional variable in the regression in column 5. The estimated 
coefficient of the spread is insignificant. Adding up to six lags of the spread did not change the results; all 
lagged coefficients were insignificant. Using an AAA rated bond to estimate the spread did not change the 
results either (the results are not shown). This result is consistent with the finding of Greasley and Madsen 
(2006) who find that the spread was not an important determinant of investment during the Great Depression in 
the US. 
In order to test for the sensitivity of the estimates to sample period, the estimation period is split before 
and after the last house price run-up started in 1994.4Q in Columns 6 and 7. The regressions show that income, 
nominal interest rates and, particularly, banks‟ willingness to lend were the key drivers of house prices before 
the mid 90s. There was very little role for securitized mortgages before 1994 as one would expect given the 
                                                 
7 This suggests that the extent to which higher interest rates can be charged on risky borrowers is limited. To some degree, banks can 
charge higher fees on risky borrowers. Furthermore, the non-banking mortgage lending sector is not subject to the same strict 
regulations as banks and, as such, is able to use interest rate charges to distinguish between borrower risk types more easily. 24 
 
fraction of securitized mortgages was less than 2 per cent of all mortgages, on average, during that period. After 
1994, nominal interest rates and securitization are shown to play very significant roles for the house price 
dynamics while the role of the traditional channel of bank lending is shown to subside. With the decline in the 
influence of bank lending, credit constraints can be expected to have been reduced and the conventional 
relationship between per capita disposable income and house prices to be substantially weakened. The results 
confirm that since the mid 1990s disposable income per capita has lost some of its influence on the behaviour of 
house prices. The rising disintermediation in the mortgage market has resulted in a disconnection between the 
change in ability to pay for a home out of income flows, and the change in the rate of house price appreciation. 
These results, in combination with the insignificance of the willingness of banks to lend to home owners for 
house prices since 1994 lends support to the theory that disintermediation has destroyed originators‟ incentives 
to ensure long term performance of mortgage loans through prudent verification of borrowers‟ abilities to pay. 
Indeed, the provision of mortgage funding through the issuance of MBS played a highly significant and 
economically important role in house price fluctuation since 1994.  
  Rent is been included as an additional regressor in the regression whose results are displayed in column 
8. Note that nominal house prices are used as the dependent variable in this regression because the theory 
predicts that nominal house prices are related to nominal rent. Income has been omitted because rent is the 
earnings from renting out properties and income should not have any independent effect on house prices. The 
rent-model follows the idea that house prices are a function of the present value of rent which reflects the 
earnings on housing investment. The estimated coefficient of rent is insignificant and may reflect that rent is 
measured as the average rent and not the rent charged at the margin. The estimated coefficients of banks‟ 
willingness to lend and Sec are again highly significant, which is further evidence of credit playing a key role in 
driving house price fluctuations. 
  Thus far demand for credit has been suppressed in the regressions. However Jaffee and Modigliani 
(1969) argue that demand for credit may also be influential for the demand for durables. Demand for credit may 
be low if would-be housing investors consider their financial prospects less advantageous. As a measure of the 
demand for credit, the Federal Reserve‟s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey’s results reporting the net 
percentage of domestic respondents reporting stronger demand for residential mortgage loans are included as an 
additional explanatory variable in the estimates in column 9. The estimated coefficient is insignificant and 
further lags (up to six) were also insignificant. Thus, it appears that it is the ease in obtaining credit that is 
driving ex post credit. 
 
4.2 Simulations 
To show the factors that have been responsible for house price fluctuations over the estimation period, Table 2 
displays the contribution of credit, nominal interest rates, and income to house price growth over the period 25 
 
from 1966 to 2008. Only the third quarter in each year is displayed in Table 2 to preserve space. The 
simulations are based on the estimates in column 1 in Table 1 (the simulations are almost identical for all the 
regressions). The last column shows actual real house price changes in percentage terms based on expected 
inflation. The model simulations show that willingness to lend is the dominant force in house price growth rates 
up to 1994 and again after 2007, while securitization is the dominating force between 1994 and 2007. Banks‟ 
willingness to lend typically contributes a two percent increase in house prices per annum during upturns and 
detracts two percent per annum during downturns. These contributions account for more than half the growth 
rates during house price cycles. The two-percent rule has been repeated during the last housing boom; however, 
not through banks‟ willingness to lend but through the channel of securitization. During the ten-year boom 
period 1998-2007, securitization explains annual real house price growth rates of 2 per cent per annum on 
average.  
  Interest rates have contributed to the recent house price run-up by about 0.2 percent a year. The interest 
rate variations are generally not that important for house prices fluctuations. Income growth rates have, on 
average, contributed to a 0.4 percentage increase in house prices. Since per capita income is increasing over 
time it is tempting to infer permanent effects of income growth on house price growth. However, house prices 
are entirely determined by acquisition costs in the long run and income can only influence the long run path of 
house prices to the extent that land prices are not perfectly elastic. Finally, the last two columns in Table 2 
suggest that the model explains a large fraction of house price fluctuations and the average growth rate in real 
house prices. Real house prices have, on average, increased 1.1 percent annually. The model predicts a 0.8 per 
increase on average. 
 
Table 2. Simulations of estimates in column 1 in Table 1. 
Third Q 
Willing. 
Lend  Sec.   Nom. Interest  Income  Pred. Tot.  Actual ex ante 
1968  1.4  0.0  -0.4  0.7  1.7  4.5 
1969  0.3  0.0  -0.7  0.6  0.2  0.7 
1970  -3.1  0.0  -0.7  0.6  -3.2  -8.7 
1971  0.1  0.0  0.9  0.5  1.5  0.5 
1972  3.4  0.0  0.2  0.7  4.4  1.5 
1973  1.9  0.0  -0.7  1.1  2.4  2.0 
1974  -0.2  0.0  -0.8  -0.4  -1.3  -1.4 
1975  -2.1  0.0  0.4  0.3  -1.4  -2.3 
1976  1.3  0.0  0.0  0.6  2.0  1.6 
1977  2.2  0.0  0.0  0.5  2.7  3.8 
1978  0.9  0.0  -0.5  0.7  1.1  4.2 
1979  -0.8  0.0  -0.9  0.1  -1.5  0.4 26 
 
1980  -3.0  0.0  -1.0  -0.1  -4.1  -1.4 
1981  -3.2  0.0  -3.1  0.6  -5.6  -2.9 
1982  -1.7  0.0  0.8  0.1  -0.7  -4.4 
1983  1.4  0.0  1.6  0.5  3.4  -0.9 
1984  3.3  0.0  -0.5  1.4  4.2  -0.1 
1985  1.9  0.0  1.5  0.3  3.7  0.9 
1986  2.1  0.4  1.2  0.6  4.3  3.0 
1987  2.6  -0.3  -0.2  0.1  2.3  2.5 
1988  1.1  0.2  0.0  0.7  1.9  0.5 
1989  0.7  0.0  0.3  0.3  1.3  1.8 
1990  0.1  0.4  -0.1  0.2  0.7  -3.1 
1991  -0.6  1.3  0.5  -0.2  1.0  -2.5 
1992  -0.8  1.7  0.8  0.4  2.1  -0.7 
1993  0.1  0.9  0.6  0.0  1.5  -2.6 
1994  0.3  0.5  -1.0  0.4  0.2  -1.9 
1995  0.2  0.0  0.6  0.2  1.0  -0.1 
1996  0.0  0.5  -0.3  0.4  0.7  -1.0 
1997  -0.1  0.8  0.4  0.4  1.6  1.0 
1998  0.0  2.1  0.4  1.0  3.4  2.3 
1999  0.0  0.9  -0.6  0.2  0.6  2.2 
2000  0.0  0.1  -0.2  0.9  0.8  3.3 
2001  0.1  0.8  0.7  0.3  1.9  4.5 
2002  -0.1  0.8  0.4  0.1  1.2  3.9 
2003  -0.3  0.0  0.2  0.5  0.4  3.0 
2004  -0.2  3.0  0.1  0.3  3.3  8.3 
2005  0.1  4.2  0.1  0.0  4.4  7.3 
2006  0.2  3.9  -0.5  0.6  4.1  2.9 
2007  0.0  1.5  0.0  0.4  2.0  -2.3 
2008  -1.8  -2.9  0.2  -0.1  -4.6  NA 
 
Looking ahead there are several forces in the model that point towards continuing falling house prices in the 
near future. First, Tobin‟s q has been well in excess of one for a long time resulting in a substantial increase in 
the number of houses that have recently been built. In other words, a supply glut will maintain its downward 
pressure on house prices for a while. Second, banks‟ willingness to lend is currently at a 19 year low and 
approaching the standard that prevailed during the housing collapses in 1970 and 1980. Indeed, banks‟ 
willingness to lend is already sharply turning negative. Third, the fraction of mortgage loans that are securitized 
is declining fast and further contributes to a drying up of mortgage financing source. This is already evident 
from the simulations in the third quarter of 2008. Fourth, per capita income growth rates are turning negative. 
Fifth, the capacity of the FED to reduce their interest rates further has been exhausted and the FED fund rate is 




5.   Conclusion 
House prices are, in conventional models, predominantly driven by income, demographics, and the user cost of 
capital (Girouard et al. 2006). Establishing a Tobin‟s q model of house prices with demand and credit 
constraints, this model suggests that house prices fluctuate around their slow-moving equilibrium due to 
changes in credit availability, income and user costs. Demand and interest rate shocks have only temporary 
effects on house prices because any discrepancy between house values and acquisition costs is closed by supply 
responses over time. However, where supply-side adjustment is slow due to regulations, permit requirements, 
and building time, demand shocks can have long-lasting effects on house prices. 
  Willingness to lend and, therefore, the availability of credit for house investment, were analytically 
shown to have opposite effects on house prices in the short run and in the long run. In the short run house prices 
are most likely to increase in response to a positive credit shock in a perfect foresight market and will 
unambiguously increase in a myopic market that fails to take account for the supply response to disequilibrium. 
In the long run, house prices were shown to be negatively related to the willingness to lend. The intuition 
behind this result is that a permanent easing of credit constraints allows builders increased access to credit. The 
consequence is a higher stock of buildings than would have prevailed under credit constrained conditions.  
  Using US survey evidence on Banks‟ willingness to lend and securitization data, the empirical estimates 
confirm that house prices fluctuate around their slow moving trend predominantly due to creditors‟ willingness 
to lend. Interest rates and income are shown to play a secondary role for house price fluctuations. While bank‟s 
willingness to lend has been the major driving force behind house price variations before 1995 and after 2007 
the most recent house price run-up has been predominantly driven by the willingness to lend among the non-
banking financial institutions. Measuring the non-banking financial sector‟s willingness to lend by the fraction 
of securitized mortgage loans, it was shown that a combination of the entire financial sector‟s willingness to 
lend and reduced nominal interest rates can explain the majority of the most recent housing bubble. Considering 
the entire estimation period from 1966 to 2008, simulations of the model reveal that willingness to lend has 
explained the lion‟s share of house price fluctuations. Structural changes in the mortgage finance market, and 
particularly the growth of disintermediation, have resulted in a divorce of the relationship between the change in 
home buyers‟ ability to pay and house price appreciation. The reduced power of income to explain house price 
variations are reflective of this trend. 
 
Data Appendix 
Willingness to lend: USA: Sourced from the Federal Reserve Bank‟s quarterly survey, the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on 
bank lending practices (Federal Reserve Bank, 2008, http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/). The most recent 
survey collected responses from 55 US domestic banks and 21 US branches and agencies of foreign banks. The data used reports the 
percentage of responding banks that affirmed tightened standards. The primary data source spanning 1990.1Q–2008.4Q is data 
pertaining to the question of whether the bank‟s credit standards for approving applications from individuals for mortgage loans to 
purchase homes has tightened over the past three months. Since data on this question is available first from 1990.1Q it is spliced and 28 
 
backdated to 1966.1Q with survey data on the question as to whether the bank‟s willingness to make consumer instalment loans has 
changed relative to three months ago. For the international panel of countries the sources of the data are listed by country as follows: 
Belgium: National Bank of Belgium Bank Lending Survey: http://www.nbb.be/pub/stats/surveys/opinions.htm France: Banque France 
Bank Lending Survey http://www.banque-france.fr/fr/statistiques/base/statmon/html/bls_trim_fr_moypondrep_blshaboffmp.htm. 
Germany: Deutsche Bundesbank Bank Lending Survey, http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/mobu/mb201102en.pdf. Ireland: Central Bank of 
Ireland, BankLending Survey http://www.centralbank.ie/frame_main.asp?pg=euro_area.asp&nv=sta_nav.asp. Netherlands: De 
Nederlandsche Bank, Bank Lending Survey, http://www.statistics.dnb.nl/index.cgi?lang=uk&todo=Bankbedr. UK: Bank of England 
Credit Conditions Survey http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/monetary/creditconditions.htm. Japan: Bank of Japan 
Loan Officer Opinion Survey http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/dl/loan/loos/index.htm/ 
House price indices: US: The house price data used for the regressions from 1970.1Q  – 2010.3Q come from the Freddie Mac 
Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index. From 1966.1Q – 1969.4Q the quarterly house prices measured by the National Association 
of Realtors was used. Specifically, an average of the median sales price of existing 1-Family homes and the median sales price of new 
1-Family homes was used to interpolate the Freddie Mac House price data back to the beginning of 1966.  
Other house prices indices used for robustness checks were the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) quarterly 
house price index available from 1975 to present, (http://www.ofheo.gov/hpi_download.aspx), and the Standard & Poors/Case-Shiller 









Fixed-mortgage interest rate and weighted average interest rate: USA: The weighted average interest rate data has been collated 
for the period 1982.3Q to 2008.2Q. For the earlier years of the sample period, the 30 year average fixed-mortgage interest rate was 
used as the average interest rate on residential mortgages. The data for these rates come from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis 
website‟s economic data base (known as FRED) (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2). The series is the Average Contract Rate on 
Commitments for Fixed-Rate First Mortgages. From the 1980s, adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) became more prevalent for 
residential mortgage loans. Data on the adjustable rate index are available from the Federal Housing Finance Board - National 
Average Contract Mortgage Rate Index History, (http://fhfb.gov/GetFile.aspx?FileID=6968). This index was the only index rate that 
federally chartered savings and loan associations could use as an adjustable-rate mortgage index in the early 1980s. This data was used 
to capture ARM interest rate movements from 1980.3Q to 1984.4Q. Proceeding 1984, and before 1992, 1 year ARM data was 
interpolated using the Federal Reserve prime rate data, one of the main indices used to index the ARMs in the US 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/Monthly/H15_PRIME_NA.txt). From 1992 until 2008, the 1 year average ARM rate 
available again from the Reserve Bank of St Louis‟s FRED was used. 
To create the weighted average interest rate for residential mortgages in the US, data pertaining to the proportion of total loans 
classified as ARM was used as the weight. This data, converted from annual to quarterly, was available from 1982.3Q to 2008.Q2 and 
obtained from two sources. From 1982 until 2005, annual data was obtained from the Federal Housing Finance Board summary data, 
Table 9: Terms on conventional single-family mortgages, annual national averages, all homes. For the final part of the sample, 
quarterly figures were acquired from the Quarterly Review of Interest Rate Risk, produced by The Office of Examinations, 
Supervision and Consumer Protection, - Risk Modelling and Analysis Division of the Office of Thrift Supervision, 
(http://www.ots.treas.gov/?p=QuarterlyReviewOfInterestRateRisk). 
For other countries the long term interest rate for lending to households to purchase houses was used. For Belgium, Germany, France, 
Ireland, Netherlands and the UK, the data was sourced form the Statistical Data Warehouse: http://sdw.ecb.int. For Japan the data was 
obtained from the Bank of Japan Website: http://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/ssi/cgi-bin/famecgi2?cgi=$nme_a000_en&lstSelection=4 
Mortgage Backed Security Issues: The flow of MBS created by private issuers of asset backed securities was obtained from Federal 
Reserve Bank Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, statistical release Z.1, table F.126. The annualised quarterly flow data 
was converted to quarterly flow data. The data are first available from December 1984. The fraction of mortgages that are securitized 
are set to zero before December 1984. The fraction of mortgages that are securitized are additively scaled down so it is zero December 
1984 to ensure that the change in securitization is gradual in the first four quarters at which the data are available. 
Inflation expectations: Sourced from the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers. The survey question is: 'By what percent do 
you expect prices to go up, on the average, during the next 12 months?'. The data used records the mean expectation. The data can be 
found at http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/ 
Real disposable income: FRED, (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred.) 
Nominal GDP: For Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Netherlands and the UK, the data was sourced form the Statistical Data 
Warehouse: http://sdw.ecb.int. For Japan the data was obtained from the Bank of Japan Website: http://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/ .  
CPI: USA: FRED, (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred.) 
For Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Netherlands and the UK, the data was sourced form the Statistical Data Warehouse: 
http://sdw.ecb.int. For Japan the data was obtained from the Bank of Japan Website: http://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/ . 29 
 
Population: FRED, (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred.) 
For Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Japan and the UK, the data was sourced form the Statistical Data Warehouse: 
http://sdw.ecb.int.  
Construction Costs: The quarterly construction cost index was constructed from annual data from the Case-Shiller data set on house 
prices available from Robert Shiller‟s Home page at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm. The data was converted to quarterly 
data by taking the annual observation as the middle point of five, interpolating between observations with a growth trend series and 
retaining the interpolated data. 
Land prices: Economic Report of the President. The data are interpolated to quarterly data using the same method as for construction 
costs. 
Rental price index: The quarterly rent price index was obtained from the Bureau of Labour Statistics website available at 
http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/outside.jsp?survey=cu 
Cash Reserve Ratio 
The Cash Reserve Ratio figures were obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank website at: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reservereq.htm 
Regulation Q data 
The information on the interest rate ceilings, as well as the changing rationale behind their continued maintenance and augmentation 
can be found in Santomero, A and Siegel, J, 1986, “Deposit Deregulation and Monetary Policy” Rochester Conference Series on 
Public Policy, Volume 24, Spring 1986, pp. 179-22 and Gilbert, R. Alton, 1986, “Requiem for Regulation Q: What It Did and Why It 
Passed Away”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, Issue 2, February. 
Regulatory change index 
For the introduction and implementation of the Monetary Control Act of 1980 see http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/8000-
2200.html. Details of the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (ILSA) can be found in Tarbert, Heath, (2001), “Rethinking 
capital adequacy: the Basel Accord and the new framework”, Business Lawyer, February, Vol. 1. For information on the history of the 
Basel Accord and the most recent progress regarding Basel II implementation and discussion regarding Basel III see 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm 
Securitisation instrument 
The value of mortgages outstanding held by Government Sponsored Enterprises (such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae), and by 
private asset backed security holders as well as the amount of mortgages outstanding at banks, savings and credit union institutions is 
sourced from the Federal Reserve Bank‟s Flow of Funds Accounts, in particular, the tables L.126 and L.218. The reserve and equity 
data come form the same source, tables L.109 – L.115. This data can be downloaded at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/statisticsdata.htm 
Information regarding temporary tax changes impacting on house purchasing decisions 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, (3 JANUARY 2001) 
EGTRRA will sunset on January 1, 2011 unless further legislation is enacted to make its changes permanent (On December 6, 
2010, President Barack Obama announced a compromise tax package proposal had been reached, centered around a 
temporary, two-year extension of the Bush tax cuts) 
The capital gains tax on qualified gains of property or stock held for five years was reduced from 10% to 8% 
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, (passed on May 28)  
This bill was passed by the United States Congress on May 23, 2003 and signed into law by President George W. Bush on May 28, 
2003. Between 2003 - 2012, those in tax brackets normally 25% or upwards faced reduced CGT of 15% (In 2013 this will increase to 
20%). 
Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009 (September 22, 2009) 
$8,000 First-time Home Buyer Tax Credit 
The tax credit now applies to sales occurring on or after January 1, 2009 and on or before April 30, 2010. However, in cases where a 
binding sales contract is signed by April 30, 2010, a home purchase completed by September 30, 2010 will qualify. For homes 
purchased on or after January 1, 2009 and on or before November 6, 2009, the income limits are $75,000 for single taxpayers and 
$150,000 for married couples filing jointly. 
For homes purchased after November 6, 2009 and on or before April 30, 2010, single taxpayers with incomes up to $125,000 and 
married couples with incomes up to $225,000 qualify for the full tax credit. 
The $6,500 Move-Up / Repeat Home Buyer Tax Credit 
The tax credit is equal to 10 percent of the home‟s purchase price up to a maximum of $6,500. The tax credit applies only to homes 
priced at $800,000 or less. The credit is available for homes purchased after November 6, 2009 and on or before April 30, 2010. 
However, in cases where a binding sales contract is signed by April 30, 2010, the home purchase qualifies provided it is completed by 
September 30, 2010. Single taxpayers with incomes up to $125,000 and married couples with incomes up to $225,000 qualify for the 
full tax credit. 
Low Income Housing Tax Credit, (February, 2009)  
The LIHTC provides funding for the development costs of low-income housing by allowing a taxpayer (usually the partners of a 
partnership that owns the housing) to take a federal tax credit equal to a large percentage of the cost incurred for development of the 
low-income units in a rental housing project. It was temporarily augmented from 3 - 9% for the cost of acquiring existing buildings 
and rehabilitating them if they were placed in service between July 30, 2008 and December 31, 2013 30 
 
One off regulatory changes: 
 The Monetary Control Act of 1980 required the Federal Reserve Bank to price its financial services competitively against the private 
sector and to establish reserve requirements for all eligible financial institutions effectively increasing the application of Cash Reserve 
Requirements to a larger number of institutions.  
In 1981, the Federal Reserve Bank and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency implemented one capital requirement, and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation  implemented another. Generally, these specified minimum primary capital ratios of between 
5% and 6%, depending on a bank's size (see http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/8000-2200.html for the act itself). 
In 1983, Congress shifted rule-making responsibility relating to financial institutions capital requirements to the Board of Governors 
of the U.S. Federal Reserve by passing the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (ILSA). The new Act engendered the 
cooperation  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  with  the  Bank  of  England  and  new  capital  adequacy  requirements  were  established 
bilaterally (Tarbert, 2001). 
In 1988 was the introduction of the Basel Accord, which replaced the asset-based primary capital requirements for US commercial 
banks. The concepts of primary and secondary capital were accounted for and replaced by tier 1 and tier 2 capital in new accord. 
Basel II, the second of the Basel Accords was adopted internationally in 2004.  This accords purpose, initially published in 
June 2004, is to create an international standard that banking regulators can use when creating regulations regarding capital 
adequacy in the face of different types of operational and financial risk. While the USA has not yet applied the Accord to all 
of its institutions, many countries have already and the expectation of its application in the future arguably has set in train the 
development and gradual adoption of standards and procedures by U.S. financial institutions that comply with this accord. In 
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